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  ABSTRACT.	  This	   paper	   carries	   out	   an	   explanatory	   investigation	   into	   the	   relationship	   between	  socio-­‐institutional	   conditions,	   quality	   of	   life	   indicators	   and	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	   Italian	  regions.	  Previous	  studies	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  quality,	  social	  capital	  and	  social	  conditions	   in	   determining	   disparities	   between	   richer	   and	   poorer	   regions.	   Building	   on	   this	  literature,	   we	   consider	   a	   three-­‐sector	   model	   of	   semi-­‐endogenous	   growth	   with	   negative	  externalities	  depending	  on	  structural	  and	  institutional	  factors	  that	  affect	  the	  innovative	  capacity	  of	   regional	   systems	   (the	   “social	   externalities	   hypothesis”).	   Simulations	   based	   on	   the	   scaled	  stationary	   system	   confirm	   that	   endogenous	   socio-­‐economic	   conditions	   are	   crucial	   for	   the	  successful	   translation	   of	   innovation	   into	   economic	   growth.	   It	   is	   suggested	   that	   generating	   a	  development	   strategy	   designed	   to	   improve	   social	   conditions	   and	   well-­‐being	   in	   the	   poorer	  regions	   may	   yield	   dividends	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   public	   policy	   and	   economic	  development.	  	  	  Keywords:	  Development,	  growth,	  regional	  disparities,	  well-­‐being.	  JEL:	  O1,	  O4,	  O30	  R11,	  R58.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Università	  Roma	  Tre,	  Via	  Silvio	  D’Amico	  77,	  00145,	  Rome,	  e-­‐mail	  gdagostino@uniroma3.it.	  **	  Università	  Roma	  Tre,	  Via	  Silvio	  D’Amico	  77,	  00145,	  Rome,	  e-­‐mail	  mscarlato@uniroma3.it.	  
	   2	  
1.	  Introduction	  As	  documented	  in	  numerous	  studies,	  the	  convergence	  between	  the	  regions	  of	  Southern	  and	  Central-­‐Northern	  Italy	  developed	  at	  a	  steady	  pace	  in	  the	  period	  1950–70	  and	  then	  slowed	  down	  before	  coming	   to	  a	  halt	   in	   the	  1980s	   (Daniele	  and	  Malanima	  2007).	   It	   is	  our	  contention	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  failure	  to	  converge	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  and	  take	   into	   account	   the	   adjustments	   currently	   altering	   the	   cornerstones	   of	   the	  model	   of	   Italian	  economic	  development	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  technical	  progress	  and	  the	  disruption	  of	  the	  global	  value	  chain.	  	  The	  basis	  of	  our	  study	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Stefano	  Fenoaltea	  on	  Italy’s	  economic	  development	  during	  the	  Liberal	  period.	  Fenoaltea	  identifies	  the	  forces	  driving	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  regions	  in	  the	  “industrial	   triangle”	   as	   natural	   resources	   –	   namely	  water	   and	   hydroelectric	   energy	   or	   “white	  coal”	   –	   during	   the	   first	   industrial	   revolution	   (c.1830–80)	   and	   human	   capital,	   which	   came	   to	  predominate	  during	  the	  second	  (1880–1915)	  (Fenoaltea	  2007).	  Emanuele	  Felice	  has	  broadened	  the	   temporal	   scale	   of	   this	   analysis	   to	   show	   that	   human	   capital	   became	   still	   more	   important	  during	  the	  20th	  century	  (until	  1970	  in	  overall	  terms),	  after	  which	  social	  capital	  (social	  networks	  and	   institutional	   efficiency)	   assumed	   primacy	   as	   a	   factor	   of	   growth	   in	   the	   post-­‐Fordist	   phase	  (Felice	  2010).	  The	  importance	  of	  social	  capital	  as	  a	  driving	  force	  of	  development	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  economic	  takeoff	  of	  the	  regions	  in	  the	  North,	  East	  and	  Centre,	  which	  owe	  their	  wealth	  to	  the	   success	   of	   the	   industrial	   districts.	   The	   social	   networks	   and	   institutions	   located	   in	   these	  districts	  made	   possible	   the	   common	   use	   of	   specific	   public	   assets,	   from	   infrastructures	   to	   the	  informal	   rules	   that	   cut	   transaction	   costs,	   thus	   fostering	   the	   expansion	   of	   flexible,	   territorially	  integrated	   firms	   specialising	   in	   the	   sectors	   of	   light	   industry	   and	   strongly	   oriented	   towards	  foreign	  markets.	  In	   a	   nutshell,	   these	   analyses	   show	   that	   the	   driving	   forces	   of	   growth	   changed	   together	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  technology,	   leading	  in	  Italy	  first	  to	  the	  takeoff	  of	  the	  Northwest	  and	  then	   to	   the	   convergence	  of	   the	   regions	   in	   the	  North,	   East	   and	  Centre.	   The	   factors	   guiding	   the	  growth	   of	   the	   central	   and	   northern	   regions	   are	   a	   mixture	   of	   fixed	   resources,	   linked	   to	   the	  territory,	  and	  mobile	  resources,	  which	  can	  also	  come	  from	  outside.	  The	  former	  include	  natural	  resources	  (sources	  of	  energy	  and	  ease	  of	  transport),	  which	  are	  crucial	   in	  the	   initial	  phase,	  and	  social	  capital,	  which	  then	  becomes	  the	  main	  driver	  behind	  growth.	  For	   the	   regions	   of	   the	   South,	   the	   period	   of	   intense	   growth	   coincided	   instead	   with	   the	  development	   of	   the	   Italian	   economy	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   was	   supported	   by	   the	   Intervento	  Straordinario,	  a	  special	  plan	  to	  develop	  infrastructures	  and	  productive	  activities	  in	  the	  South.	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The	   Intervento	   Straordinario	   channelled	   huge	   flows	   of	   resources	   from	   the	  North	   to	   the	  South	  so	  as	   to	   increase	  the	   latter’s	  endowment	  of	   technical	  and	   financial	  capital.	  Local	   labour-­‐intensive	  activities	  such	  as	  light	  industry	  and	  tourism	  were,	  however,	  neglected	  or	  crowded	  out,	  there	   was	   no	   improvement	   in	   technical	   and	   higher	   education,	   the	   supply	   of	   services	   fell	  increasingly	  behind	  the	  requirements	  of	  firms	  and	  citizens,	  and	  social	  capital	  was	  eroded	  due	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  rent-­‐seeking	  activities	  designed	  to	  intercept	  the	  flow	  of	  public	  resources.	  Fenoaltea	   and	   Felice	   argue	   that	   the	   Intervento	   Straordinario	   failed	   because	   it	   focused	  almost	   exclusively	   on	   exogenous	   resources,	   namely	   public	   spending	   and	   the	   technology	  incorporated	  in	  imported	  machinery	  and	  the	  investments	  of	  firms	  based	  in	  the	  Centre	  and	  North	  as	  well	  as	  a	  small	  number	  of	   foreign	  firms.	  This	  model	  of	  externally	  “forced”	  development	  had	  temporary	  effects	  that	  gradually	  faded	  with	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	   immaterial	   factors	  of	  growth,	  which	  are	  primarily	  local	  by	  nature	  but	  absent	  or	  very	  weak	  in	  Southern	  Italy.	  While	  the	  analysis	  of	  Fenoaltea	  and	  Felice	  stops	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  framework	  of	  fixed	  and	  mobile	  resources	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  With	  the	  interruption	  of	   the	   national	   policy	   of	   development	   (the	   Intervento	   Straordinario)	   and	   the	   launching	   of	   a	  policy	  of	  European	  cohesion	  (the	  Nuova	  Programmazione),	  the	  1990s	  saw	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	   South	   into	   a	   sort	   of	   laboratory	   for	   replication	   of	   the	  model	   of	   diffuse	   industrialisation	   of	  Central	  and	  Northern	  Italy.	  The	  decentralisation	  of	  regional	  policy	  was	  supposed	  to	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  spending,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  achieved	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  managerial	  capacity	  of	  the	  southern	  regions	  (D’Antonio	  and	  Scarlato	  2008).	  Moreover,	  the	  forms	  of	  action	  taken	  have	  remained	  unchanged	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  past.	  The	   area	   is	   no	   more	   than	   a	   passive	   receptacle	   for	   new	   flows	   of	   public	   expenditure.	   The	  participation	   of	   local	   actors	  manifests	   itself	   in	   the	   proliferation	   of	   proposals	   and	   agreements	  regarding	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	   resources	   for	   the	   indiscriminate	   support	   of	   firms	   and	  citizens’	   incomes	  (Pigliaru	  2009,	  Scarlato	  2010).	  The	  structural	  funds	  have	  made	  no	  impact	  on	  regional	  disparities	  in	  terms	  of	  labour	  productivity	  (Aiello	  and	  Pupo	  2009).	  There	  has	  been	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  endowment	  of	  human	  and	  social	  capital	  and	  collective	  services	  and	  no	  appreciable	  effort	  to	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  public	  and	  private	  institutions	  (Cannari	  2009,	  De	  Blasio	  and	  Nuzzo	   2010).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   progressive	   deterioration	   of	   the	   social	   and	   environmental	  indicators	   is	   taking	  place	   in	   the	  southern	  regions	  and	   the	  disparity	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  Centre	  and	  North	  in	  terms	  of	  collective	  services	  is	  now	  greater	  than	  the	  disparity	  in	  terms	  of	  per	  capita	  product	   (DPS	   2010).	   It	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   in	   this	   connection	   that	   the	   investigations	   into	  public	  services	  carried	  out	  over	  the	  last	  few	  years	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  Italy	  (summarised	  in	  Bripi	  et	  al.	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2011)	  show	  that	  the	  territorial	  disparities	  in	  performance	  are	  due	  not	  to	  lower	  public	  spending	  per	  capita	  but	  rather	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  organisational	  models	  adopted.	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  our	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  halt	  in	  convergence	  with	  the	  Centre	  and	  North.	  The	  Intervento	  Straordinario,	  based	  on	  pumping	  in	  resources	  from	  outside,	  worked	  because	  it	  was	  easier	  in	  the	  past	  for	  technology	  to	  be	  incorporated	  in	  physical	  capital,	  understood	  as	  imported	  machinery	  and	  the	  monolithic	  plants	  of	  major	  corporations	  located	  in	  the	  South.	  In	   the	   present-­‐day	   scenario,	   technology	   is	   instead	   dematerialized	   and	   transversal,	  requiring	  local	  skills	  and	  excellence	  capable	  of	  adding	  specific	  advantages	  to	  the	  product,	   links	  with	   the	   advanced	   tertiary	   sector,	   the	   ability	   to	   govern	   the	   networks	   of	   knowledge	   scattered	  over	  the	  territory	  and	  outside	  the	  local	  system,	  and	  strong	  coordination	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  host	  of	   small	   firms	   (Rullani	   2009,	   Federico	   2010).	   These	   are	   the	   elements	   emphasised	   in	   recent	  theoretical	   studies	   on	   innovation.	   Knowledge	   emerges	   as	   the	   result	   of	   collective	   activity,	   the	  production	   of	   which	   goes	   beyond	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	   single	   firm	   and	   derives	   rather	   from	   the	  interaction	  of	  economic	  agents	  through	  formal	  and	  informal	  mechanisms	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  flows	  of	   connections	   outside	   the	   firm	   (Quatraro	   2010,	   Iammarino	   2005).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   regional	  capacity	   for	   innovation	   proves	   highly	   idiosyncratic	   and	   bound	   up	   with	   conditions	   of	   the	  economic	  and	  institutional	  environment	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  replicate	  in	  other	  regions.	  	  While	   the	   last	   few	   years	   have	   seen	   a	   return	   to	   the	   centrality	   of	   natural	   resources	   in	  economic	  analyses,	  their	  importance	  regards	  aspects	  that	  are	  very	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  past,	   such	   as	   a	   healthy	   environment,	   amenities,	   collective	   services,	   affordable	   housing,	   good	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  connections	  between	  urban	  centres	  equipped	  with	  advanced	  services	  (Glaeser	  and	   Gottlieb	   2008,	   Glaeser	   and	   Resseger	   2010).	   These	   factors	   of	   intangible	   and	   localised	  advantage	  constitute	  “territorial	  capital”	  (Camagni	  2009)	  and	  prove	  crucial	   in	  determining	  the	  potential	  capacity	  of	  regions	  to	  attract	  investment	  and	  human	  capital	  (Farole	  et	  al.	  2011).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  numerous	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  intangible	  disadvantages	  of	  context	  in	  the	  less	  developed	  regions	  cannot	  be	  offset	  by	  a	  system	  of	  financial	  or	  fiscal	  incentives	  (Daniele	  2007,	  Barba	  Navaretti	  et	  al.	  2009).	  The	  weakness	  of	  territorial	  capital	  in	  the	  South	  of	  Italy	  means	  limited	  capacity	  to	  attract	  mobile	  resources.	  For	  example,	  human	  capital	  is	  an	  exclusively	  outwardly	  mobile	  resource	  in	  the	  South	   for	   reasons	   that	   go	   beyond	   the	   difficulties	   of	   access	   to	   the	   job	   market	   (few	   job	  opportunities	  for	  qualified	  young	  people	  without	  networks	  of	  family	  and	  friends,	  poor	  quality	  of	  life,	   and	   the	  attraction	  of	  university	  education	   in	   the	  Centre	  and	  North,	  which	   is	   superior	  and	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provides	  qualifications	  taken	  more	  seriously	  by	  prospective	  employers)	  (D’Antonio	  and	  Scarlato	  2007,	  Mocetti	  and	  Porello	  2010).	  Finally,	  the	  primary	  fixed	  resources,	  namely	  social	  and	  institutional	  capital,	  have	  become	  increasingly	   important	  as	   regards	   territorial	   response	   to	  external	   shocks	  because	   the	  capacity	  for	  governance	  and	  coordination	  of	   the	  supply	  of	   the	  collective	   factors	   that	  determine	  growth	  (knowledge,	  environment	  and	  networks)	  depends	  largely	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutions	  (Dasgupta	  2005,	  Acemoglu	  2009,	  Trigilia	  and	  Burroni	  2009).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  extra-­‐economic	  factors,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  social	  conditions	  affect	  long-­‐term	  expectations	  and	  hence	  incentives	  for	  investment,	  decisions	  for	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources,	   confidence	   and	   the	   generation	   of	   networks	   (Thorbecke	   2007,	   Ravallion	   2010).	   For	  example,	  Crescenzi	  and	  Rodríguez-­‐Pose	  (2009)	  analyse	  the	  variables	  that	  act	  as	  a	  “social	  filter”	  and	  affect	   the	  territorial	  disparities	  between	  the	  European	  regions	  so	  as	   to	  enhance	  or	  reduce	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  regional	  systems	  of	   innovation.	  Royuela	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  instead	  show	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  life1	  in	  the	  major	  cities	  of	  a	  territory	  has	  a	  very	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  economies	  of	  agglomeration	  and	  hence	  the	  growth	  prospects	  of	  a	  regional	  system	  of	  innovation.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  provide	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  institutional	  and	  social	  variables	  and	  quality	  of	   life	  –	   factors	  specifically	   linked	   to	   the	  regional	  contexts	  –	  play	  a	  key	  part	  in	  determining	  the	  effective	  ability	  of	  firms	  to	  translate	  the	  resources	  and	  technology	  available	  into	  increased	  competitiveness.	  Adopting	  the	  evolutionary	  approach	  to	  technological	   change,	  we	   argue	   that	   technological	   skills	   are	   the	   result	   of	   interaction	   between	  individuals,	   firms	  and	  organizations	  within	  a	   specific	   socio-­‐economic	  and	   institutional	   context	  (Iammarino	   et	   al.	   2009,	   Von	   Tunzelmann	   and	   Wang	   2007).	   We	   thus	   maintain	   that	   socio-­‐institutional	   conditions	   generate	   an	   externality	   affecting	   the	   capacity	   for	   the	   absorption	   of	  knowledge	   and	   the	   economic	   growth	   of	   regional	   systems,	   and	   that	   this	   accounts	   for	   the	  persistence	  of	  territorial	  disparities	  between	  the	  Italian	  regions	  despite	  the	  major	  efforts	  made	  since	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  by	  national	  policy	  and	  European	  regional	  policy.	  Taking	  the	  considerations	  outlined	  above,	  which	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  regional	  divides	  in	  Italy	  and	  various	  investigations	  into	  economic	  growth	  and	  development,	  as	  its	  starting	  point,	  our	  study	  seeks	   to	  combine	   the	   traditional	  driving	   forces	  of	  growth	  and	   those	   linked	   to	  institutions	  and	  social	  conditions	  in	  a	  unified	  theoretical	  framework.	  Our	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  low	  quality	  of	  the	  human	  capital	  and	  collective	  services	  in	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  South	  of	  Italy,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Quality	  of	  life	  is	  defined	  here	  by	  means	  of	  objective	  indicators	  regarding	  public	  assets,	  collective	  services	  and	  other	  socio-­‐economic	   aspects	   that	   increase	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   those	   living	   in	   a	   place.	   See	   Gasper	   (2010)	   for	   the	   various	  definitions	  of	  quality	  of	  life.	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provide	  an	  approximate	  yardstick	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  regional	  context	  as	  regards	  social	  and	  institutional	  conditions,	  acts	  as	  a	  negative	  externality	  that	  limits	  the	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge	  in	   the	   economic	   system,	   thus	   obstructing	   growth	   and	   innovation.	   The	   paper	   is	   organised	   as	  follows.	  The	  first	  section	  presents	  a	  model	  of	  endogenous	  growth	  that	  generate	  the	  externalities	  linked	  to	  socio-­‐institutional	  factors	  and	  shows	  how	  these	  hinder	  the	  transmission	  of	  knowledge	  and	   growth	   prospects.	   The	   second	   describes	   the	   econometric	   methodology	   used	   to	   test	   our	  hypotheses	  on	  the	  Italian	  regions	  in	  the	  period	  1998–2008	  and	  discusses	  the	  results	  obtained.	  The	  third	  states	  the	  conclusions	  and	  suggests	  some	  implications	  for	  policy	  making.	  	  
2.	  An	  illustrative	  model	  
	  
2.1	  The	  assumptions	  of	  the	  model	  We	  consider	  a	  representative	  household	  that	  maximises	  an	  intertemporal	  utility	  deriving	  from	  private	   consumption.	   The	   instantaneous	   utility	   function	    u(c) 	  is	   presented	   as	   a	   constant	  elasticity	  of	  substitution	  (CES)	  function	  in	  the	  following	  form:	  
	  
 
max
c t( ) ∫
c1−σ
1− σ
e−ρtdt 	   (1)	  
where	   σ 	  is	   the	   elasticity	   of	   intertemporal	   substitution	   of	   private	   consumption,	   ρ 	  the	  intertemporal	   discount	   rate,	   and	   c = C / L 	  the	   share	   of	   private	   consumption	   per	  worker.	   The	  representative	  houseold	  is	  a	  consumer	  and	  producer	  of	  the	  sole	  final	  good	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  final	  good	  is	  produced	  by	  means	  of	  a	  Cobb-­‐Douglas	  technology,	  described	  as	  follows:	  
	  
 
Y = ALY( )α
0
A
∫xi1−αdi 	   (2)	  
where	   LY 	  is	   the	   number	   of	   workers	   employed	   in	   the	   production	   of	   final	   goods	   and	   xi is	   the	  single	  kind	  of	  intermediate	  good	  employed	  in	  production.	  	  The	  production	  function	  thus	  described	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  technological	  progress,	  manifested	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  variety	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  (Dixit	  and	  Stiglitz	  1977,	  Ethier	  1982).	  Invention	  corresponds	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  method	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  produce	  the	  final	  good	  described	  by	  equation	  (2)	  in	  an	  alternative	  (and	  more	  efficient)	  way.	  In	  this	  formulation,	  decreasing	  returns	  disappear	  due	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  kinds	  of	  intermediate	  goods,	  which	  then	  tend	  to	  increase	  total	  productivity.	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As	  production	  in	  the	  sector	  of	  final	  goods	  takes	  place	  through	  a	  technology	  with	  constant	  returns	  to	  scale,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  consider	  a	  single	  price-­‐taking	  firm	  in	  determining	  the	  optimal	  quantity	  of	  the	  final	  good	  produced.	  The	  firm	  operates	  in	  the	  perfectly	  competitive	  sector	  of	  the	  production	  of	  final	  goods	  (SFG).	  This	  means	  that	  when	  the	  price	  of	   Y 	  is	  normalised	  to	  1	  at	  every	  moment	  of	  time,	  the	  profit	  maximisation	  leads	  to	  the	  following	  conditional	  demand	  function:	  
	  
 
w = α Y
LY
	   (3)	  
and	  
	  
 
p(x)i = 1−α( ) Yxi
∀i 	   (4)	  
where	   w 	  is	   the	  unit	  wage	  paid	  to	  workers	   in	   the	  sector	  of	   final	  goods	  and	   p(x)i 	  the	  return	  of	  the	  kind	   i 	  of	  intermediate	  good.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  equations	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  enable	  us	  to	  characterise	   the	   parameters	  α 	  and	   (1−α ) 	  in	   terms	   of	   the	   elasticity	   of	   the	   factors	   LY 	  and	   xi 	  with	  respect	  to	  total	  production2.	  The	  second	  sector,	  SIG,	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  production	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  and	  made	  up	  of	  an	   infinite	  number	  of	   firms	   in	   the	   interval	  between	  0	  and	  A	  whereas	   the	   third	  one,	  defined	  as	  research	   and	  development	   sector	   SR&D,	   is	   characterised	   by	   perfect	   competition.	   Through	   the	  purchasing	  of	  a	  project	  (or	  patent)	  from	  the	  SR&D,	  every	  firm	  in	  the	  SIG	  becomes	  the	  only	  one	  capable	   of	   producing	   that	   particular	   kind	   of	   intermediate	   good	   and	   therefore	   operates	   in	  monopoly	  conditions.	  It	  is	  assumed	  for	  simplicity	  that	  the	  intermediate	  firm	  (which	  bought	  the	  project	   from	   the	   SR&D)	   can	   transform	   every	   unit	   of	   capital	   acquired	   into	   one	   unit	   of	   the	  intermediate	   good.	  As	   this	   transformation	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   reversible,	   the	   intermediate	   good	  can	  be	  turned	  back	  into	  capital	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period.	  Each	  SIG	  firm	  will	  therefore	  pursue	  the	  goal	  of	  maximising	  its	  profit	  at	  every	  moment	  of	  time	  by	  solving	  the	  following	  problem:	  
	  
 
max
xi
p x( )i xi − rxi 	   (5)	  
where	   p(x)i 	  is	  the	  price	  of	  the	  kind	  i	  of	  intermediate	  good	  and	  
  
r the	  return	  on	  capital	  per	  unit	  of	  time.	  Solving	   the	  problem	  of	  profit	  maximisation	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	  obtain	   the	  conditions	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	   property	   depends	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   firms	   producing	   final	   goods	   operate	   in	   conditions	   of	   perfect	  competition	  and	  are	  characterised	  by	  constant	  returns	  to	  scale.	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optimality	   expressed	   by	   the	   equations	   of	   the	   prices	   and	   the	   quantities	   supplied	   by	   the	   firm,	  described	  as	  follows:	  
	  
 
p x( )i =
p = r
(1−α )
∀i 	   (6)	  
and	  
	  
 
xi =
x =
(1−α )LY
α
p
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
1/α
∀i 	   (7)	  
where	  equation	  (5)	  is	  inserted	  into	  (6)	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  two	  relations	  and	  where	   x 	  and	   p 	  are	   respectively	   the	   optimal	   price	   and	   quantity	   set	   by	   the	   monopolist	   in	   the	   sector	   of	  intermediate	  goods.	  The	  result,	  described	  in	  (7)	  and	  (8),	  represents	  a	  standard	  problem	  of	  profit	  maximisation	   in	  monopoly	   conditions	  with	   constant	  marginal	   costs	   and	   constant	   elasticity	   of	  demand.	  On	  inserting	  the	  optimal	  prices	  and	  quantities	  into	  the	  monopolist’s	  profit	  function	  (5),	  its	  optimal	  profit	  can	  be	  derived	  as:	  
	  
 
π i =
π = α(1−α ) Y
A
	   (8)	  
Equations	  (6),	  (7)	  and	  (8)	  show	  that	  every	  firm	  operating	   in	  the	  SIG	  sets	  the	  same	  price	  and	   sells	   the	   same	   quantity	   of	   the	   durable	   good	   it	   produces.	   Together	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  intermediate	  goods	  and	  capital	  are	  linked	  by	  the	  relation
 
K = x di
0
A
∫ = Ax ,	   	   this	  consideration	  leads	  to	  the	  rewriting	  of	  (2)	  as:	  
	  
 
Y = LY A( )α K (1−α ) 	   (9)	  
Finally,	   it	   is	  shown	  through	  the	  combination	  of	  (7)	  and	  (8)	  that	  the	  return	  on	  the	  capital	  invested	  in	  the	  SIG	  (in	  monopoly	  conditions)	  is	  lower	  than	  it	  would	  be	  in	  conditions	  of	  perfect	  competition,	  thus	  compensating	  the	  work	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  SR&D.	  While	  the	  value	  of	  the	  return	  on	  capital	  invested	  in	  conditions	  of	  perfect	  competition	  is	  given	  by	   r = (1−α )Y / K 	  the	  return	  of	  the	  SR&D	  is	  described	  as:	  
	  
 
r = (1−α )2 Y
K
	   	  (10)	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We	  shall	  now	  take	  up	  the	  primary	  innovation	  of	  the	  growth	  model	  of	  Jones	  (1995),	  namely	  the	  technology	  accumulation	  function,	  which	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  linear	  functional	  form,	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Romer	  (1990).	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  model,	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  the	  stock	  of	   knowledge	   or	   technology	   in	   the	   economy	   depends	   in	   fact	   to	   a	   decreasing	   (rather	   than	  constant)	   degree	   on	   the	   levels	   of	   knowledge	   and	   employment	   in	   the	   sector.	   This	   assumption	  means	  that	  the	  function	  of	  technology	  accumulation	  is	  no	  longer	  linear	  but	  convex.	  	  If	   A 	  is	  the	  level	  of	  acquired	  knowledge	  and	   LA 	  	  the	  level	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  sector,	  the	  technology	  accumulation	  function	  can	  be	  written	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  
	    
A = δLA
λ Aϕ 	   (11)	  
where	   	  represents	   the	   externalities	   linked	   to	   the	   level	   of	   acquired	   knowledge	   and	   the	  workforce	  employed	  in	  the	  SR&D,	  while	  φ 	  and	  λ 	  respectively	  represent	  the	  productivity	  of	  the	  level	   of	   acquired	   knowledge	   in	   the	   economic	   system	   and	   of	   the	   workforce	   employed	   in	   the	  production	  of	  new	  technology.	  Three	  distinct	   situations	   can	  be	   identified	   according	   to	   the	   assumptions	   adopted	  on	   the	  parameters	  φ 	  and	  λ :	  1)	   φ = 1	  and	   λ = 1,	  in	  which	  case	  equation	  (12)	  is	  reduced	  to	   A = δLA A ,	  the	   functional	   form	   described	   by	   Romer	   (1990)3;	   2)	   φ = 0 	  and	   λ = 1 ,	   or	   φ = 1and	   λ = 0 	  in	  which	   case,	   respectively,	   the	   accumulation	   of	   technology	   is	   independent	   either	   of	   acquired	  knowledge	   or	   of	   the	   workforce	   employed	   in	   the	   SR&D;	   3)	    φ < 1 and	    λ < 1 ,	   where	   the	  accumulation	  of	  technology	  is	  decreasing	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  two	  factors.	  An	   alternative	   	   structure	   to	   the	   one	   described	   above,	   proposed	   by	   Steger	   (2005)	   and	  others,	   suppose	   a	   linear	   functional	   form	   for	   the	   tecnology	   accumulation	   function	   as	   in	  Romer	  (1990),	  which	  allowed	  to	  interpret	  the	  parameters	  φ 	  and	  λ 	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  elasticity	  of	  factors	  within	  the	  technology	  accumulation	  function4.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  process	  of	  technology	  accumulation	  has	  constant	  returns	  to	  scale,	  so	  that	   φ + λ = 1 .	  However,	  given	  that	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  ideas	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  duplications	  of	  discoveries	  already	  acquired	  (something	  known	  as	  the	   “fishing	   out”	   effect),	   there	   is	   a	   negative	   externality	   affecting	   the	   knowledge	   already	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  formulation	  of	  technology	  with	  constant	  returns	  to	  scale	  means	  that	  the	  production	  of	   final	  goods	  takes	  place	  with	  increasing	  returns	  to	  scale,	  thus	  generating	  explosive	  growth.	  4	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  since	  the	  SR&D	  is	  perfectly	  competitive,	  the	  function	  has	  constant	  returns	  to	  scale	  and	  the	  parameters	  ϕ and	   λ 	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  elasticity	  of	  factors	  with	  respect	  to	  technology.	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accumulated.	  Under	  this	  new	  assumption,	  even	  if	   φ + λ = 1 ,	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  negative	  externality	  (defined	  as	  
 
eφ < 0 ),	  we	  obtain	  that	   φ + eφ + λ < 1 .	  The	  primary	  advantage	  of	  this	  theoretical	  formulation	  lies	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  interpreting	  the	   parameters	  φ 	  and	  λ 	  once	   again	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   elasticity	   of	   the	   factors	   A 	  and	   LY .	   As	  previously	  mentioned,	  this	  interpretation	  is	  possible	  solely	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perfectly	  competitive	  market	   structures	   and	   hence	   constant	   returns	   to	   scale.	   The	   formulation	   adopted	   makes	   it	  possible	  to	  keep	  the	  returns	  to	  scale	  constant	  while	  avoiding	  the	  generation	  of	  explosive	  growth.	  If	  we	  adopt	  formulation	  (11),	  assume	  that	  the	  project	  created	  in	  the	  SR&D	  is	  sold	  on	  the	  market	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  at	  a	  price	  equal	  to	   PA 	  and	  bear	  in	  mind	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  SR&D	  is	  a	  sector	  of	  perfect	   competition,	   it	   follows	   that	  every	  worker	  will	  move	   into	   this	   sector	  until	   the	  wage	  received	  is	  no	  longer	  as	  much	  as	  the	  wage	  that	  would	  be	  received	  in	  the	  SFG.	  This	  means	  that:	  
	  
 
w = PA
A
LY
	   (12)	  
where	  w	  is	  contemporary	  	  the	  unit	  wage	  paid	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  (see	  equation	  4)	  and	  in	  the	  SR&D.	  Equalisation	  of	  the	  two	  equations	  gives	  the	  following:	  
	  
 
PA =
α
δ
Aα −ϕ (L − LA )
α −1 LA
1−λK1−α , 	   (13)	  
where	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  the	  price	  paid	  for	  every	  project	  is	  an	  increasing	  function	  of	  the	  intensity	  of	  capital	  K.	  This	  means	  that	  if	  innovations	  are	  to	  be	  implemented,	  a	  quantity	  of	  capital	  must	  be	  invested.	  The	  greater	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  capital	  employed	  in	  the	  creation	  both	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  and	  of	  new	  technology,	  the	  smaller	  its	  compensation	  will	  be	  (11)	  and	  hence	  the	  higher	  the	  profit	  of	  the	  monopolist	  in	  the	  SIG.	  	  	  	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  decisions	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  SIG	  as	  regards	  the	  production	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  good	  depend	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  cost	  of	  buying	  the	  project	  (patent)	  from	  the	  SR&D	  ( PA ),	  and	  the	  monopoly	  return,	  the	  firm	  operating	  in	  the	  SR&D	  will	  set	  the	  price	  of	  the	  patent	  so	  as	  to	  equal	  the	  discounted	  value	  of	  profits	  in	  the	  SIG.	  Since	  every	  kind	  of	  intermediate	  good	  gives	  all	   the	   firms	  the	  same	  profit	  at	  every	  moment	  of	   time,	   this	  means	  that	   the	  equation	  governing	  arbitrage	  must	  always	  be	  satisfied:	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r =
π
PA
+
PA
PA
	   (14)	   	  
	   This	  equation	  can	  be	   interpreted	  as	  meaning	   that	   the	   firm	   in	   the	  SR&D	  will	   adjust	   the	  price	  of	  a	  project	  until	   the	  decision	  whether	  to	  purchase	  it	  and	  embark	  on	  the	  production	  of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  intermediate	  good	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  indifference	  to	  the	  monopolist	  in	  the	  SIG.	  	  	  	  
2.2.	  The	  solution	  of	  the	  model	  The	   main	   characteristic	   of	   semi-­‐endogenous	   growth	   models	   	   is	   the	   ineffectiveness	   of	   policy	  actions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  rate	  of	  growth.	  As	  shown	  by	  Steger	  (2005),	  the	  solutions	  of	  the	  market	   and	   the	   social	   planner	   coincide	   in	   terms	   of	   long-­‐term	   growth	   but	   tend	   instead	   to	  diverge	  as	  regards	  the	  rate	  of	  balanced	  growth,	   in	  which	  case	  the	   latter	  gives	  better	  results	   in	  terms	  of	  welfare.	  Given	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis,	  however,	  we	  shall	  present	  only	  the	  market	  solution.5	  In	   accordance	   with	   the	   above	   observations,	   we	   shall	   now	   outline	   the	   decentralised	  solution	   of	   the	   semi-­‐endogenous	  model	   of	   Jones	   (1995),	   solving	   the	   problem	   of	   consumption	  utility	   maximisation	   (1)	   under	   the	   constraint	   of	   the	   accumulation	   of	   capital,	   described	   as	  follows:	  
	    K = Y − C, 	   (15)	  where	   	  is	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  capital.	   It	   is	  easy	  to	  show	  that	  equation	  (15)	  can	  be	  rewritten	  in	  terms	  of	  costs	  of	  factors	  of	  production	   K = rK + wL + PA A+ Aπ − C .	  	   The	   solution	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   representative	   consumer	   as	   regards	   the	  market	   of	  final	  goods	  can	  be	  obtained	  through	  the	  maximisation	  of	  (1)	  under	  constraint	  (15)	  with	  respect	  to	  consumption	  per	  capita	  and	  capital.	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  equation	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  consumption	  described	  as	  follows6:	  
	  
 
γ =
C
C
=
1
σ
r − n − ρ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + n 	   (16)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  a	  detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  implications	  in	  terms	  of	  welfare,	  see	  Steger	  (2005),	  Eicher	  and	  Turnovsky	  (1999)	  and	  Jones	  (1995).	  6	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  using	  the	  version	  of	  the	  budget	  constraint	  in	  terms	  of	  prices	  of	  factors	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  rewrite	  the	  equation	  as	  
 
γ = 1
σ
r−
L
L
−ρ
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥+
L
L
.	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where	   r	   is	   the	   return	   on	   capital,	   as	   described	   in	   equation	   (10),	   and	  n	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   the	  workforce.	  	   In	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  system	  with	  stationary	  variables,	  we	  can	  follow	  Steger	  (2005)	  and	  rewrite	  equations	  (11),	  (14),	  (15)	  and	  (16)	  in	  terms	  of	  scaled	  variables	  defined	  as	   y = Y / LβK ,	  n  k = K / LβK ,	    c = C / LβK ,	    a = A / LβA ,	    a = A / LβA ,  pA = PA / LβK ,  ζ = LY / LβA 	  and	  
 (1−ζ ) = LA / L
βA ,	  where	  
 
βk =
1−φ + eφ + λ
1−φ + eφ
	  	  and	  
 
βA =
φ + eφ
1− λ
	  .	  The	  analytical	  derivation	  of	  the	  
parameters	   used	   to	   construct	   the	   system	   with	   scaled	   variables	   employs	   the	   social	   planner’s	  solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   intertemporal	   optimisation	   of	   the	   representative	   consumer	  (Steger	  2005).	  The	  system	  of	  equations	  characterising	  the	  optimality	  conditions	  and	  the	  social	  planner’s	  problem	  at	  the	  same	  time	  can	  therefore	  be	  rewritten	  as:	  	  
	  
 
γ = c = c
σ
r − (1− σ )n − ρ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − βK nc 	   (17)	  
	    
k = y − c − βK nc 	   (18)	  
	  
 
a = δaφ 1− ς( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
λ
− βAna 	   (19)	  
	  
 
pA

= pA r − n( ) − π 	   (20)	  
	  
 
α y
ζ
=
α j
(1−ζ )
	   (21)	  
where	   Y = (aζ )α k1−α ,	   j = δ (1−ζ )λ aφ , r = (1−α )2 yk 	  	  and	   π = α(1−α ) ya 	  .	  	  	  In	   particular,	   (17),	   (18)	   and	   (19)	   are	   respectively	   the	   Keynes-­‐Ramsey	   rule	   of	   optimal	  private	  consumption	  and	  the	  equations	  of	  motion	  for	  private	  capital	  and	  technology,	  (20)	  is	  the	  price	  of	  the	  projects	  produced	  by	  the	  SR&D,	  and	  (21)	  describes	  the	  optimal	  allocation	  of	  labour	  between	  the	  SFG	  and	  the	  SR&D.	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2.3	  Simulations	  and	  empirical	  specification	  To	  complete	  the	  theoretical	  analysis,	  we	  now	  present	  the	  results	  of	  the	  simulations	  of	  the	  system	  of	   equations	   (17)–(21)	  under	   the	   initial	   conditions	   k(0) = k0 	  and	   a(0) = a0 .	   Given	  our	  interest	   in	  examining	  the	  role	  of	   technological	  progress	  and	  the	  accumulation	  of	  knowledge	   in	  the	   economic	   system,	   particular	   attention	   will	   be	   focused	   on	   the	   parameters	   characterising	  equation	  (19),	  namely	  ϕ 	  and	  λ .	  Moreover,	  the	  fishing-­‐out	  hypothesis	  inserted	  into	  the	  model	  by	  Steger	  (2005)	  will	  again	  be	   used	   in	   order	   to	   distinguish	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	   elasticities	   linked	   to	   R&D	   and	   the	  accumulation	   of	   human	   capital.	   This	   hypothesis	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	   analyse	   the	   presence	   of	  negative	   externalities	  within	   the	   process	   of	   technology	   accumulation	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   to	  insert	  the	  negative	  externalities	  linked	  to	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  context	  in	  which	  the	  knowledge	  is	  absorbed	  and	  disseminated	  (referred	  to	  here	  as	  the	  social	  externality).	  As	  outlined	  in	  the	  introduction,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  institutional	  and	  social	  context	   influences	  the	  ability	  of	   firms	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  knowledge	  available.	  The	  (negative)	   externalities	   deriving	   from	   socio-­‐institutional	   frictions	   thus	   reduce	   the	   impact	   of	  technology	  on	   the	  economic	  system.	   In	  order	   to	  keep	  the	  model	  simple,	   it	   is	  assumed	  that	   the	  overall	  negative	  externality	  comprises	  both	  the	  component	  linked	  to	  fishing	  out	  and	  the	  one	  due	  to	  the	  socio-­‐institutional	  friction	  hindering	  the	  spread	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  economic	  system.	  For	  simplicity	  and	  with	  no	  loss	  of	  generality,	  however,	  it	  is	  assumed	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  model	  that	  the	  externality	  deriving	   from	  the	  hypothesis	  of	   fishing	  out	   is	  both	  constant	  and	  negligible	   in	  scale.	  The	   externality	   eϕ ,	   for	   which	   the	   term	   “social	   filter”	   will	   be	   used	   from	   now	   on,	   can	   thus	   be	  identified	  on	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  social	  externality	  alone.	  Figure	   1	   presents	   the	   results	   of	   simulations	   for	   different	   values	   of	   eϕ .	   The	   variables	  considered	  are	  private	  consumption,	  private	  investment,	  technology	  and	  the	  price	  of	  the	  goods	  of	   the	  SR&D.	  As	   the	   first	  panel	  of	   the	   figure	   shows,	  a	  high	  value	  of	   the	  externality	   eϕ 	  tends	   to	  reduce	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   innovative	   activity,	   thus	   leading	   to	   a	  drop	   in	  private	   consumption,	  private	  investment	  and	  technology,	  and	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  prices	  in	  the	  SR&D.	  Conversely,	   as	   panel	   d	   shows,	   a	   value	   of	   0.2	   rather	   than	   0.8	   for	   the	   externality	  means	   higher	  levels	  of	  private	  consumption,	  private	  investment	  and	  technology	  together	  with	  lower	  prices	  for	  the	   patents	   produced	   in	   the	   SR&D.	   This	   result	   bears	   out	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   negative	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externalities	   linked	   to	   obstructions	   in	   the	   spread	   of	   knowledge	   have	   a	   major	   impact	   on	   the	  growth	  of	  the	  economic	  system.	  	  
	  	   Figure	  1	  –	  Trends	  for	  the	  primary	  variables	  of	  the	  model	  
	  a)	  
 
λ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.4, eϕ = 0.8 	   	   b)	   λ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.4, eϕ = 0.6 	  
	  c)	  
 
λ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.4, eϕ = 0.4 	   	   d)	   λ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.4, eϕ = 0.2 	   	  Note.	  The	  parameters	   ρ=0.02 ,	   δ=0.1 	  and	   n pop = 0.015 	  are	  used	  in	  the	  simulations	  presented	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relax	  algorithm	  (Trimborn	  2008).	  	  
3.	  An	  estimate	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  for	  the	  Italian	  regions	  The	   hypotheses	   arising	   from	   the	   theoretical	   model	   can	   be	   tested	   for	   the	   Italian	   regions	   by	  estimating	  a	  composite	  indicator	  that	  includes	  yardsticks	  of	  competitiveness	  and	  environmental	  and	   social	   sustainability.	   This	   indicator	   should	   serve	   to	   measure	   the	   level	   of	   the	   social	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externalities	   present	   in	   the	   process	   of	   technology	   accumulation,	   which	   have	   effects	   on	   the	  economic	  system	  and	  on	  territorial	  growth	  prospects,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  The	  identification	   process	   draws	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Crescenzi	   and	   Rodríguez-­‐Pose	   (2009),	   which	  calculates	   a	   measurement	   of	   the	   social	   filter	   for	   the	   European	   regions	   based	   exclusively	   on	  variables	  regarding	  human	  resources	  and	  demographic	  structure.	  We	  shall	  instead	  broaden	  the	  analysis	  to	  consider	  also	  variables	  reflecting	  other	  social	  and	  institutional	   dimensions	   that	  may	   affect	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   regions.	   In	   particular,	   the	  variables	   that	   define	   the	   social	   filter	   for	   each	   Italian	   region	   can	   be	   identified	   primarily	   in	   the	  three	   spheres	   of	   social	   exclusion	   (Riggi	   and	   Maggioni	   2009),	   the	   educational	   level	   of	   the	  population	   (Lundvall	   1992,	   Bramanti	   and	   Riggi	   2009,	   Crescenzi	   and	   Rodríguez-­‐Pose	   2009,	  Castellacci	   and	  Archibugi	   2008)	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   territory	   (Camagni	   2009,	   Capello	   et	   al.	  2009).	  	  	  The	   indicator	   is	   constructed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   targets	   set	   by	   the	   Dipartimento	   delle	  Politiche	   di	   Sviluppo	   (DPS:	   Department	   of	   Development	   Policies)	   in	   the	   last	   cycle	   of	   regional	  policies	   (2007–13)	   with	   reference	   to	   some	   essential	   services.	   As	   regards	   the	   first	   sphere	   of	  interest,	   namely	   social	   exclusion,	   three	   variables	   are	   considered:	   1)	   long-­‐term	  unemployment	  (ld);	  2)	  the	  rate	  of	  juvenile	  unemployment	  (dg);	  3)	  the	  index	  of	  regional	  poverty	  of	  families	  (pf).	  The	   first	   is	   constructed	   as	   the	   percentage	   of	   people	   seeking	   employment	   for	   over	   12	  months	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total	  workforce,	  the	  second	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  aged	  15–24	  seeking	  employment	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   same	   age	   group	   in	   the	   total	  workforce,	   and	   the	   third	   as	   the	  percentage	  of	  families	  living	  beneath	  the	  poverty	  threshold.	  	  The	   variables	   regarding	   the	   second	   sphere,	   which	   describes	   the	   quality	   of	   human	  resources,	  are	  as	   follows:	  1)	   the	  drop-­‐out	  rate	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  year	  of	  high	  school	   (ass),	  characterised	  as	  the	  number	  of	  drop-­‐outs	  among	  pupils	  enrolled	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  high	  school	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total;	  2)	  the	  rate	  of	  secondary	  education	  (es),	  defined	  as	  the	  total	  number	  of	  high	   school	   pupils	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   14–18	   age	   group	   of	   the	   resident	   population;	   3)	   the	  percentage	  of	  employed	  people	  taking	  part	  in	  courses	  of	  training	  and	  education	  (let),	  defined	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  employed	  adults	  aged	  25–64	  involved	  in	  training	  and	  education	  schemes	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  corresponding	  age	  group	  of	  the	  employed	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Finally,	  two	  variables	  are	  used	  to	  pinpoint	  territorial	  quality:	  1)	  the	  presence	  of	  municipal	  waste-­‐sorting	   services	   (rd);	   2)	   the	   families’	   perception	   of	   the	   risk	   of	   crime	   in	   the	   area	  where	  they	  live	  (rc).	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Table	  1	  presents	  the	  primary	  results	  of	  principal	  component	  analysis	  (PCA)	  regarding	  the	  eight	  variables	  selected	  within	  the	  three	  dimensions	  identified.	  The	  estimate	  refers	  to	  the	  year	  2008.	  As	  the	  table	  shows,	  the	  first	  component	  accounts	  for	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  set	  of	  variables,	  with	  a	  cumulative	  frequency	  equal	  to	  44%	  of	  the	  information	  as	  a	  whole.	  When	  the	  second	  component	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  the	  cumulative	  frequency	  rises	   to	   approximately	   80%	   of	   the	   total	   information.	   This	   result	   appears	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	  correct	   variables	   have	   been	   chosen	   to	   measure	   the	   competitiveness	   and	   socio-­‐institutional	  conditions	  of	  the	  regions.	  	   	   Table	  1	  –	  Estimate	  of	  the	  principal	  components	  for	  the	  Italian	  regions,	  2008	  
	   Comp	  I	   Comp	  II	   Comp	  III	   Comp	  IV	   Comp	  V	   Comp	  VI	   Comp	  VII	   Comp	  VII	  Eigenvalue	   3.867	   2.734	   0.728	   0.297	   0.205	   0.073	   0.062	   0.036	  Frequency	   0.483	   0.342	   0.091	   0.037	   0.026	   0.009	   0.008	   0.005	  Cumulative	  frequency	   0.483	   0.825	   0.916	   0.953	   0.979	   0.988	   0.996	   1.000	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Comp	  I	   Comp	  II	   Comp	  III	   Comp	  IV	   Comp	  V	   Comp	  VI	   Comp	  VII	   Comp	  VII	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  es	   0.165	   0.553	   -­‐0.032	   0.136	   -­‐0.330	   0.225	   0.601	   -­‐0.356	  ld	   0.487	   -­‐0.049	   -­‐0.180	   0.143	   0.341	   -­‐0.145	   -­‐0.300	   -­‐0.694	  dg	   0.486	   -­‐0.108	   0.014	   0.143	   0.084	   -­‐0.637	   0.433	   0.363	  let	   0.028	   0.568	   -­‐0.012	   0.552	   -­‐0.128	   -­‐0.150	   -­‐0.504	   0.282	  rd	   -­‐0.435	   0.128	   0.349	   0.346	   0.681	   -­‐0.053	   0.274	   -­‐0.106	  rc	   0.5090	   0.137	   -­‐0.333	   -­‐0.542	   0.491	   0.095	   -­‐0.011	   0.262	  pf	   0.450	   -­‐0.222	   0.066	   0.330	   0.210	   0.699	   0.051	   0.317	  ass	   0.297	   0.183	   0.854	   -­‐0.338	   -­‐0.047	   -­‐0.009	   -­‐0.175	   -­‐0.041	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  The	  lower	  section	  of	  the	  table	  shows	  the	  contributions	  of	  each	  variable	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  all	  the	  principal	  components.	  Since	  the	  first	  two	  components	  prove	  predominant,	  the	  other	  six	  emerging	   from	   PCA	   are	   discarded.	   The	   first	   component	   is	   characterised	   by	   high	   positive	  coefficients	   with	   respect	   to	   long-­‐term	   unemployment	   (ld),	   juvenile	   unemployment	   (dg),	  household	  poverty	  (pf)	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  crime	  (rc).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  variables	  connected	  with	   level	   of	   education	   and	   human	   capital	   all	   have	   negative	   coefficients	   apart	   from	   the	   one	  regarding	   the	   school	   drop-­‐out	   rate.	   Particularly,	   the	   negative	   sign	   of	   the	   school	   drop-­‐out	   rate	  variable	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	   expectations,	   since	   it	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   attractivity	   of	   the	   school	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system.	   These	   results	   appear	   to	   bear	   out	   the	   identification	   of	   the	   first	   component	   as	   a	   social	  filter.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  as	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  A,	  where	  we	  report	  PCA	  estimations	  for	  1998,	  the	  results	  of	  PCA	  remain	  constant	  over	  time.	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  the	  table	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  put	  forward	  an	  identification	  also	  for	  the	  second	  principal	  component,	  which	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  strongly	  positive	   incidence	  of	  the	  variables	   connected	   with	   education	   and	   human	   capital	   in	   general	   and	   could	   therefore	   be	  identified	   as	   an	   index	   of	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   economic	   system	   referring	   primarily	   to	   the	  endowment	   of	   human	   capital.	   This	   second	   identification	   proves	   less	   immediate,	   however,	   in	  view	   of	   the	   positive	   coefficients	   of	   certain	   variables,	   such	   as	   the	   risk	   of	   crime	   and	   juvenile	  unemployment.	  	  Figure	  2	  –	  Relations	  between	  the	  first	  two	  principal	  components	  for	  each	  region,	  2008	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  Figure	   2	   presents	   the	   ranking	   of	   the	   Italian	   regions	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   two	   principal	  components	   identified	   above.	   Some	   clarification	   is	   needed,	   however,	   before	   proceeding.	   First,	  Component	  I	  can	  be	  reasonably	  identified	  as	  social	  filter	  and	  it	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  100,	  where	  the	  lower	  values	  represent	  the	  absence	  of	  socio-­‐institutional	  problems.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  social	  filter	  has	  greater	  importance	  in	  the	  Italian	  regions	  on	  the	  positive	  side	  of	  the	  axis.	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Second,	   Component	   II	   is	   measured	   on	   a	   scale	   from	   0	   to	   100,	   where	   the	   positive	   values	  correspond	  to	  a	  great	  competitive	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  economic	  system.	  Two	   primary	   results	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   figure.	   First,	   the	   regions	   of	   the	   South	   are	  concentrated	   in	   the	  right	  half	  of	   the	  diagram	  and	   therefore	  characterised	  by	  high	   incidence	  of	  the	  social	  filter.	  Second,	  among	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  Centre	  and	  North,	  which	  are	  concentrated	  in	  the	   left	   half	   (scarce	  presence	   of	   negative	   externalities	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   character),	  the	   regions	   of	   the	   Northwest	   are	   distinguished	   by	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  economic	   system	   (Component	   II).	   Furthermore,	   except	   for	   Campania,	   characterized	   by	   high	  values	  of	  both	  the	  principal	  components,	  all	  the	  regions	  located	  in	  South	  Italy	  area	  characterized	  by	   high	   values	   for	   the	   social	   filter	   (Component	   I)	   and	   low	   degree	   of	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  economic	  system	  (Component	  II).	  	  	   Figure	  3	  –	  Estimate	  of	  the	  social	  del	  filter	  for	  the	  Italian	  regions,	  1998–2008	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  Finally,	   Figure	   3	   shows	   the	   trends	   of	   the	   social	   filter	   over	   time	   for	   each	   of	   the	   regions	  considered,	  the	  results	  being	  obtained	  by	  extending	  the	  PCA	  to	  cover	  the	  period	  1998–2008.	  The	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figure	  shows	  evolution	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  present	  in	  the	  regional	  systems	  over	  time,	  increasing	  for	   example	   in	   Lombardy,	   Emilia	   Romagna,	   Campania,	   Puglia	   and	   Sicily	   but	   decreasing	   for	  Sardinia	  and	  Abruzzo.	  	  
4.	  Results	  of	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  
	  
4.1.	  Econometric	  method	  Equations	   (17)–(21)	   characterise	   the	   path	   of	   growth	   depending	   on	   the	   accumulation	   of	  physical	   and	   human	   capital,	   investment	   in	   R&D	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   social	   filter.7	  For	   the	  purposes	  of	  empirical	  analysis,	  the	  results	  outlined	  in	  section	  2	  will	  be	  used	  to	  characterise	  the	  trends	   of	   the	   variables	   and	   the	   signs	   expected	   in	   the	   relations.	   Let	   us	   therefore	   specify	   the	  following	  growth	  function:	  	  
	    ! it = "1! it#1 + $2 p _ invit#1 + $3tecit#1 + $4 Xit + vi +%t + & it 	   (22)	  	  where	    i and	    t 	  characterise	   every	   region	   and	   temporal	   period	   (with	    t = 1,........T ),	   and	  
 
Xit = Chumit ,Sfilterit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ 	   ! it"1 	  is	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   per	   capita	   GDP	   at	   time	   t !1 ,	   p _ invit−1 	  private	   investment	   at	   t !1 ,	   Chumit human	   capital,	   tecit!1 	  the	   level	   of	   technological	   knowledge,	  and	   Sfilterit 	  the	  social	  filter	  identified	  and	  estimated	  in	  section	  3.	  Equation	   (22)	   highlights	   some	   problems	   regarding	   the	   econometric	   estimate.	   First,	   the	  two	   specific	   non-­‐observable	   terms	  of	   the	   individual	   region	   vi 	  and	   the	   time	  period	   !t 	  must	   be	  handled	   in	  different	  ways	  due	   to	   the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	   the	  equation.	  To	  be	  more	  specific,	   the	  first	  effect	  is	  addressed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  dummy	  variables	  and	  the	  second	  requires	  the	  use	  of	  first	  difference	  	  estimator.	  Second,	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	   loss	  of	  efficiency,	   it	   is	  necessary	   for	   the	  estimator	   to	   take	   into	  account	   the	   presence	   of	   endogeneity	   in	   at	   least	   two	   explanatory	   variables,	   namely	   private	  investment	   and	   the	   level	   of	   technological	   knowledge.	   The	   hypothesis	   of	   endogeneity	   in	   these	  regressors	  depends	  directly	  on	  the	  accumulation	  functions	  described	  by	  equations	  (18)	  and	  (19)	  respectively.	  Furthermore,	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  since	  the	  share	  of	  the	  workforce	  in	  the	  SR&D	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  order	   to	  keep	   the	  econometric	  model	  as	   simple	  as	  possible,	   the	  price	  of	  projects/patents	   for	   the	  production	  of	  new	  kinds	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  is	  taken	  as	  equal	  to	  1.	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depends	  on	  the	  wages	  received	  by	  the	  workers	  there	  in	  comparison	  with	  wages	  in	  the	  sector	  of	  final	  goods,	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  endogeneity	  can	  be	  assumed	  also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  human	  capital.	  The	   Generalized	   Method	   of	   Moments	   (GMM)	   for	   panel	   data,	   originally	   presented	   by	  Arellano	   and	  Bond	   (1991)	   and	  Arellano	   and	  Bover	   (1995),	   is	   used	   to	   estimate	   equation	   (22).	  These	  estimators	  are	  based	  first	  on	  the	  first	  difference	  of	  the	  regressors,	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  non-­‐observable	  effects,	  and	  second	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  past	  values	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  and	  the	  regressors	  as	  instruments	  to	  eliminate	  the	  problems	  due	  to	  endogeneity.	  Equation	  (22)	  can	  therefore	  be	  rewritten	  as:	  	  	  
	    !" it = #1!" it$1 + %2!p _ invit$1 + !%3tecit$1 + %4!Xit + !& it 	   (23)	  	  where	  all	  the	  variables	  are	  now	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  deviation	  from	  the	  mean.	  Thus	  specified,	  equation	  (23)	  violates	  the	  assumption	  of	  non-­‐correlation	  between	  the	  term	  of	  error Δε it 	  and	  the	  dependent	   variable	    !" it#1 expressed	   at	   time	    t !1 .	   Use	   of	   the	   instruments	   thus	   becomes	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	   restore	   both	   the	   assumption	   of	   non-­‐correlation	   and	   the	   assumption	   of	  exogeneity	  in	  the	  regressors	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  efficiency	  and	  bias	  in	  the	  estimator,	  which	  derives	  from	  the	  excessive	  use	  of	  instruments,	   in	   terms	   of	   lags	   of	   the	   variables	   included	   in	   the	   econometric	   specification.	   As	  discussed	  by	  Roodman	  (2009),	  the	  over-­‐use	  of	  instruments,	  especially	  when	  the	  cross-­‐sectional	  component	   is	  small,	   can	   lead	  to	  a	  non-­‐robust	  estimate	  of	   the	  parameters.	   In	  order	   to	   limit	   the	  presence	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  estimates,	  it	  is	  advisable	  to	  use	  only	  one	  lag	  for	  each	  explanatory	  variable.	  	  In	   order	   to	   avoid	   this	   potential	   problem,	   use	   is	   made	   here	   of	   the	   set	   of	   instruments	  described	   above	   as	   regards	   the	   regression	   of	   the	   first	   differences.	   These	   are	   appropriate	  instruments	  when	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  and	  the	  specific	   non-­‐observable	   term	   of	   the	   individual	   region	   remains	   constant	   for	   the	   entire	   period.	  	  The	  moment	  conditions	  for	  the	  system	  of	  equations	  (22)	  and	  (23)	  can	  therefore	  be	  written	  as:	  	  
	    E[! it"2 (!it " !it"1)] = 0 	   	  
	    E[Xit!2 (!it ! !it!1)] = 0 	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where	   Xit+ p 	  is	  the	  vector	  of	  explanatory	  variables	  that	  also	  includes	  the	  endogenous	  variables.	  Particularly,	   if	  we	  define	   Δε i 	  as	   the	  vector	  of	   transformed	  error	   terms	  and	   Zit 	  as	   a	   composite	  matrix	  of	   instruments,	  where	  each	  row	  contains	   instruments	   that	  are	  valid	   for	  a	  given	  period,	  the	  set	  of	  moment	  conditions	  can	  be	  written	  concisely	  as:	  	  	  
 E[Zi 'Δε i ] = 0 	  	  The	  use	  of	  these	  moment	  conditions	  makes	   it	  possible	  to	  obtain	  efficient	  and	  robust	  estimates	  through	  utilisation	  of	  the	  GMM	  estimator.	  A	  crucial	  assumption	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  GMM	  is	  that	  the	  instruments	  are	  exogenous.	  If	  the	  model	   is	   exactly	   identified,	   detection	   of	   invalid	   instruments	   is	   impossible	   because	   even	  when	  
 E[Zi 'Δε i ] ≠ 0 	  the	   estimator	   will	   choose	    βˆ 	  so	   that	    Z ' Eˆ = 0 exactly.	   But	   if	   the	   model	   is	  overidentified,	   a	   test	   statistic	   for	   the	   joint	   validity	   of	   the	   moment	   conditions	   (identifying	  restrictions)	   falls	  naturally	  out	  of	   the	  GMM	  framework.	  The	  Hansen	  (1982)	   J 	  test	  statistic	   for	  overidentifying	  restrictions	  impose	  that,	  under	  the	  null	  of	  joint	  validity,	  the	  vector	  of	  empirical	  moments	  
 
1
N
Z ' Eˆ is	  randomly	  distributed	  around	  0.	  A	  Wald	  test	  can	  check	  this	  hypothesis	  and	  
has	   a	   χ 2 	  distribution	  with	   degrees	   of	   freedom	  equal	   to	   the	   degree	   of	   overidentication,	   j − k .	  When	   the	   sample	   size	   N	   goes	   to	   infinity,	   the	   Hansen	   test	   coincides	   with	   the	   Sargan	   (1958)	  statistic.	  	  Sargan	  Hansen	  statistics	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  test	  cc	  the	  validity	  of	  subsets	  of	  instruments,	  via	  a	  “difference	  in	  Sargan"	  test,	  also	  known	  as	  a	   C 	  statistic.	  If	  one	  performs	  an	  estimation	  with	  and	   without	   a	   subset	   of	   suspect	   instruments,	   under	   the	   null	   of	   joint	   validity	   of	   the	   full	  instrument	   set,	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   two	   reported	   Sargan	   Hansen	   test	   statistics	   is	   itself	  asymptotically	    χ 2 distribution,	   with	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   equal	   to	   the	   number	   of	   suspect	  instruments.	   The	   regression	   without	   the	   suspect	   instruments	   is	   called	   the	   unrestricted	  regression	  since	  it	  imposes	  fewer	  moment	  conditions.	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐Sargan	  test	  is	  of	  course	  only	  feasible	  if	  this	  unrestricted	  regression	  has	  enough	  instruments	  to	  be	  identified.	  	  Finally,	   since	   the	   estimations	   and	   the	   test	   of	   overidentified	   restrictions	   are	   valid	   only	  when	  there	  is	  no	  residual	  autocorrelation	  in	  the	  error	  term,	  we	  use	  an	  Arellano-­‐Bond	  statistic	  to	  test	  for	  absence	  of	  second	  order	  autocorrelation.	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4.2	  Results	  The	  data	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  growth	  equation	  (23)	  for	  the	  Italian	  regions	  over	  the	  period	  2000–2008	   are	   extrapolated	   from	   the	   DPS-­‐ISTAT	   (Department	   for	   Development	   Policies-­‐National	   Institute	   of	   Statistics)	   territorial	   database	   on	   development	   policies.	   The	   choice	   of	  period	   depends	   largely	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   data.	   The	   dependent	   variable	   	   γ t 	  is	   the	   yearly	  growth	   rate	   of	   Gross	   Domestic	   Product	   per	   capita	   and	   p _ invit−1 	  is	   the	   ratio	   of	   gross	   private	  investment	  to	  GDP.	  The	  number	  of	  patents	  registered	  at	  the	  European	  Office	  Patent	  per	  million	  inhabitants	   indicates	  the	   level	  of	   technological	  knowledge	   in	  the	  economic	  system,	   tecit−1 ,	  and	  
 Chumit 	  	  represents	  the	  share	  of	  human	  capital	  described	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  25–64	  age	  group	  attending	  years	  course	  of	  study	  or	  professional	  training.	  Finally,	  	   Sfilterit 	  is	  the	   score	   for	   each	   region	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   first	   principal	   component,	   identified	   here	   as	   the	  social	  filter.	  As	  showed	  in	  section	  3,	  this	  measurement	  is	  scaled	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  an	  index	  from	  0	  to	  100,	  where	  100	  indicates	  the	  worst	  performance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  on	  the	  economic	  system.	  Appendix	  2	  reports	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  all	  the	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis.	  Table	  2	  presents	  the	  estimates	  for	  the	  growth	  equation.	  While	  those	  in	  the	  first	  column	  are	  calculated	   by	   means	   of	   the	   basic	   model,	   taking	   into	   account	   only	   the	   variables	   of	   private	  investment	   and	   human	   capital,	   those	   in	   the	   second	   also	   reflect	   the	   level	   of	   technological	  knowledge.	   The	   social	   filter	   is	   then	   added	   in	   the	   third,	   interaction	   between	   the	   filter	   and	   the	  level	  of	  technological	  knowledge	  in	  the	  fourth.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  investment	   p _ invit−1 	  and	  the	   level	   of	   technological	   knowledge	    tecit−1 	  are	   included	   in	   the	   estimate	   as	   endogenous	  variables	  with	  lags	  to	  take	  into	  account	  their	  respective	  functions	  of	  accumulation,	  as	  described	  in	  (18)	  and	  (19).	  Generally	  speaking	  ,	  the	  estimates	  presented	  are	  significant	  and	  all	  the	  variables	  show	  the	  expected	  signs,	  with	  all	  the	  introduced	  controll	  variables	  (such	  as	  the	  time	  dummy	  and	  the	  time	  trend	   for	   island	   areas	   d .islands )	   are	   strogly	   significan.	   	   This	   result	   demonstrates	   the	   model’s	  ability	   to	   describe	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   accumulation	   of	   technological	   knowledge,	  human	  capital,	  socio-­‐institutional	  conditions	  and	  growth	  in	  the	  Italian	  regions.	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Table	  2-­‐	  Results	  of	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  growth	  equation,	  full	  sample	  analysis	  
	   I	   	   II	   	   III	   	   IV	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 γ t−1 	   0.273	   ***	   0.245	   ***	   0.238	   ***	   0.153	   **	  	   (0.086)	   	   (0.072)	   	   (0.084)	   	   (0.060)	   	  
 Chumit 	   0.203	   **	   0.172	   **	   0.160	   **	   0.095	   *	  	   (0.868)	   	   (0.822)	   	   (0.771)	   	   (0.593)	   	  
 p _ invit−1 	   0.237	   **	   0.301	   ***	   0.242	   **	   0.219	   ***	  	   (0.108)	   	   (0.099)	   	   (0.100)	   	   (0.085)	   	  
 tecit−1 	   	   	   0.040	   ***	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   (0.008)	   	   	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit 	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.049	   **	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.020)	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit xtecit 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.009	   ***	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.003)	   	  
 d .islands 	   -­‐0.289	   **	   -­‐0.322	   ***	   -­‐0.221	   *	   -­‐0.282	   *	  	   (0.132)	   	   (0.110)	   	   (0.117)	   	   (0.146)	   	  
 d .2001 	   -­‐2.154	   	   -­‐1.675	   	   -­‐1.229	   	   -­‐0.932	   	  	   (1.558)	   	   (1.588)	   	   (1.306)	   	   (1.083)	   	  
 d .2002 	   -­‐3.884	   **	   -­‐3.284	   *	   -­‐2.995	   **	   -­‐2.779	   **	  	   (1.726)	   	   (1.709)	   	   (1.456)	   	   (1.270)	   	  
 d .2003 	   -­‐3.835	   **	   -­‐3.546	   **	   -­‐3.065	   **	   -­‐2.902	   ***	  	   (1.572)	   	   (1.534)	   	   (1.258)	   	   (1.103)	   	  
 d .2004 	   1.169	   **	   0.782	   	   1.155	   **	   0.026	   	  	   (0.494)	   	   (0.537)	   	   (0.452)	   	   (0.439)	   	  
 d .2005 	   -­‐0.799	   	   -­‐0.875	   *	   -­‐0.571	   	   -­‐1.190	   ***	  	   (0.569)	   	   (0.551)	   	   (0.470)	   	   (0.452)	   	  
 d .2006 	   2.021	   ***	   1.691	   ***	   2.089	   ***	   1.103	   ***	  	   (0.437)	   	   (0.469)	   	   (0.372)	   	   (0.374)	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  N	   147	   	   147	   	   147	   	   147	   	  N	  instruments	   26	   	   27	   	   27	   	   27	   	  Arellano	  Bond	  	  test	   -­‐0.127	   	   0	  .386	   	   0.985	   	   -­‐0.658	   	  	   (0.898)	   	   (0.699)	   	   (0.324)	   	   (0.510)	   	  Hansen	  test	   25.10	   	   16.66	   	   19.35	   	   19.32	   	  	   (0.068)	   	   (0.118)	   	   (0.055)	   	   (0.023)	   	  Difference	  in	  Hansen	  test	   7.41	   	   11.89	   	   8.50	   	   16.88	   	  	   (0.388)	   	   (0.156)	   	   (0.386)	   	   0.018	   	  Sargan	  Test	   30.245	   	   29.423	   	   31.074	   	   23.904	   	  	   (0.035)	   	   (0.043)	   	   (0.028)	   	   (0.066)	   	  	  Note:	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  per-­‐capita.	  The	  asterisks	  indicate	  the	  levels	  of	  significance	  of	  the	  parameters:	  *	  0.10,	  **	  0.05	  and	  ***	  0.01.	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In	  more	  specific	  terms,	  the	  first	  two	  columns	  of	  the	  Table	  show	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  capital	  and	  technological	  knowledge	  in	  fostering	  Italy’s	  economic	  growth,	  with	  coefficients	  from	  0.56	  to	  0.095	  ( )	  and	  0.040	  	  ( )	  respectively.	  As	  expected	  (see	  Lodde	  2008,	  Hirsch	  e	  Sulis	   2009,	   Marrocu	   e	   Paci	   2010,	   Quatraro	   2009),	   the	   more	   innovative	   regions,	   which	   are	  characterised	   by	   higher	   levels	   of	   patents	   and	   human	   capital,	   register	   better	   performance	   in	  terms	  of	  economic	  growth.	  This	  situation	  changes	  considerably	  when	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  social	   filter	  on	  the	  economic	  system	  is	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  In	  line	  with	  our	  hypotheses,	  poor	  performance	  as	  regards	  the	  factors	  of	  a	  social	  and	  institutional	  character	  affects	  the	  propagation	  of	  technological	  knowledge,	  with	   a	  direct	   impact	   on	   regional	   growth	   equal	   to	   -­‐0.049	   ( Sfilterit ).	   The	   scale	   of	   this	   parameter	  proves	   larger	   than	   the	   estimate	   of	   Crescenzi	   and	   Rodríguez-­‐Pose	   (2009)	   for	   the	   European	  regions,	  where	   the	   value	   registered	   for	   the	   social	   filter	  was	   about	   0.010.	  As	   noted	   above,	   our	  findings	   differ	   substantially	   from	   those	   of	   Crescenzi	   and	   Rodríguez-­‐Pose,	   who	   include	   only	  aspects	  connected	  with	  human	  capital	  in	  the	  social	  filter.	  Moreover,	  when	  the	  indirect	  channel	  ( Sfilterit xtecit ),	  which	  indicates	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  on	  the	  region’s	  innovative	  capacity,	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  on	  the	  growth	  proves	  stronger	  still,	  with	  a	  coefficient	  of	   -­‐0.009.	   	  This	   interaction	  term	  is	  interpreted	   as	   a	   joint	   variation	   of	   the	   technological	   knowledge	   and	   of	   the	   social	   filter,	   which	  produces	   an	   adjointed	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   GDP	   per-­‐capita	   through	   the	  investment	  channel	  as	  showed	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  As	  a	  first	  result,	  estimations	  presented	  in	  Table	  2	  suggest	  the	  good	  ability	  of	  the	  proposed	  endogenous	   growth	   model	   to	   explain	   growth	   patterns	   of	   the	   Italian	   regions,	   whereas	   the	  proposed	  test	  statistics	  confirm	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  results.	  Particularly,	  Arellano-­‐Bond	  second	  order	  autocorrelation	  test	  excludes	  the	  presence	  of	  residual	  autocorrelation	  in	  the	  error	  term	  of	  equation	   (22)	  whereas	  Hansen,	   Sargan	   and	   difference	   in	   Sargan	   tests	   show	   that	   the	  model	   is	  correctly	  identified	  and	  that	  the	  chosen	  instruments	  are	  exogenous.	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Table	  3-­‐	  Results	  of	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  growth	  equation,	  North	  sub-­‐sample	  
	   I	   	   II	   	   III	   	   IV	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 γ t−1 	   0.304	   **	   0.287	   **	   0.297	   **	   0.285	   **	  	   (0.124)	   	   (0.117)	   	   (0.126)	   	   (0.142)	   	  
 Chumit 	   1.102	   ***	   0.949	   ***	   1.077	   ***	   1.124	   ***	  	   (0.291)	   	   (0.241)	   	   (0.328)	   	   (0.347)	   	  
 p _ invit−1 	   -­‐0.028	   	   0.012	   	   -­‐0.043	   	   -­‐0.045	   	  	   (0.179)	   	   (0.152)	   	   (0.181)	   	   (0.223)	   	  
 tecit−1 	   	   	   0.040	   ***	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   (0.006)	   	   	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit 	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.036	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.031)	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit xtecit 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.011	   *	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.007)	   	  
 d .2002 	   -­‐0.361	   	   -­‐0.593	   	   -­‐0.344	   	   -­‐0.314	   	  	   (0.562)	   	   (0.542)	   	   (0.573)	   	   (0.581)	   	  
 d .2003 	   -­‐1.468	   ***	   -­‐1.338	   ***	   -­‐1.467	   ***	   -­‐1.537	   ***	  	   (0.379)	   	   (0.358)	   	   (0.377)	   	   (0.408)	   	  
 d .2004 	   -­‐1.386	   ***	   -­‐1.342	   ***	   -­‐1.391	   ***	   -­‐1.396	   ***	  	   (0.408)	   	   (0.372)	   	   (0.405)	   	   (0.405)	   	  
 d .2005 	   -­‐1.502	   ***	   -­‐1.522	   ***	   -­‐1.481	   ***	   -­‐1.610	   ***	  	   (0.428)	   	   (0.430)	   	   (0.440)	   	   (0.438)	   	  
 d .2006 	   -­‐3.769	   ***	   -­‐3.148	   ***	   -­‐3.773	   ***	   	   	  	   (0.461)	   	   (0.496)	   	   (0.480)	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  N	   87	   	   87	   	   87	   	   87	   	  N	  instruments	   27	   	   28	   	   28	   	   28	   	  Arellano	  Bond	  	  test	   0.662	   	   0.397	   	   0.540	   	   -­‐0.331	   	  	   (0.507)	   	   (0.691)	   	   (0.588)	   	   (0.740)	   	  Hansen	  test	   34.94	   	   21.82	   	   36.67	   	   12.90	   	  	   (0.000)	   	   (0.026)	   	   (0.000)	   	   (0.115)	   	  Difference	  in	  Hansen	  test	   6.15	   	   15.17	   	   11.51	   	   9.12	   	  	   (0.407)	   	   (0.034)	   	   (	  11.51	  )	   	   (0.167)	   	  Sargan	  Test	   31.904	   	   25.993	   	   32.158	   	   15.318	   	  	   (0.022)	   	   (0.099)	   	   (0.021)	   	   (0.428)	   	  	  Note:	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  per-­‐capita.	  The	  asterisks	  indicate	  the	  levels	  of	  significance	  of	  the	  parameters:	  *	  0.10,	  **	  0.05	  and	  ***	  0.01.	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Table	  4-­‐	  Results	  of	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  growth	  equation,	  South	  sub-­‐sample	  	  
	   I	   	   II	   	   III	   	   IV	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
 γ t−1 	   0.174	   	   0.257	   *	   0.143	   	   0.016	   	  	   (0.142)	   	   (0.149)	   	   (0.144)	   	   (0.137)	   	  
 Chumit 	   0.090	   	   0.380	   	   -­‐0.144	   	   0.487	   	  	   (0.552)	   	   (0.528)	   	   (0.632)	   	   (0.411)	   	  
 p _ invit−1 	   0.426	   ***	   0.542	   ***	   0.367	   **	   0.263	   *	  	   (0.165)	   	   (0.164)	   	   (0.185)	   	   (0.155)	   	  
 tecit−1 	   	   	   0.037	   **	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   (0.015)	   	   	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit 	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.054	   *	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.030)	   	   	   	  
 Sfilterit xtecit 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.009	   ***	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.003)	   	  
 d .2001 	   2.866	   **	   3.259	   **	   2.353	   *	   2.694	   **	  	   (1.353)	   	   (1.337)	   	   (1.453)	   	   (1.052)	   	  
 d .2002 	   1.087	   	   1.531	   	   0.625	   	   0.784	   	  	   (1.322)	   	   (1.311)	   	   (1.385)	   	   (1.024)	   	  
 d .2003 	   0.778	   	   1.457	   	   0.158	   	   0.390	   	  	   (1.197)	   	   (1.148)	   	   (1.503)	   	   (0.952)	   	  
 d .2004 	   1.995	   ***	   1.727	   ***	   1.891	   ***	   0.704	   	  	   (0.510)	   	   (0.563)	   	   (0.502)	   	   (0.555)	   	  
 d .2005 	   0.331	   	   0.401	   	   0.179	   	   -­‐0.259	   	  	   (0.442)	   	   (0.430)	   	   (0.483)	   	   (0.425)	   	  
 d .2006 	   2.593	   ***	   2.655	   ***	   2.481	   ***	   1.360	   ***	  	   (0.479)	   	   (0.554)	   	   (0.452)	   	   (0.473)	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  N	   60	   	   60	   	   60	   	   60	   	  N	  instruments	   26	   	   27	   	   27	   	   27	   	  Arellano	  Bond	  	  test	   -­‐1.204	   	   -­‐0.843	   	   1.320	   	   0.3122	   	  	   (0.228)	   	   (0.398)	   	   (0.186)	   	   (0.754)	   	  Hansen	  test	   19.11	   	   19.21	   	   16.44	   	   4.55	   	  	   (0.059)	   	   (0.057)	   	   (0.126)	   	   (0.805)	   	  Difference	  in	  Hansen	  test	   13.93	   	   17.34	   	   14.93	   	   3.77	   	  	   (0.052)	   	   (0.027)	   	   0.061	   	   (0.806)	   	  Sargan	  Test	   21.692	   	   20.674	   	   21.692	   	   16.740	   	  	   (0.245)	   	   (0.296)	   	   (0.245)	   	   (0.334)	   	  	  Note:	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  per-­‐capita.	  The	  asterisks	  indicate	  the	  levels	  of	  significance	  of	  the	  parameters:	  *	  0.10,	  **	  0.05	  and	  ***	  0.01.	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Tables	  3	  and	  4	  replicate	  the	  estimations	   in	  two	  sub-­‐samples	  of	  regions	  defined	  as	  North	  and	  South	  respectively.	  The	  first	  sample	  includes	  all	  the	  regions	  located	  in	  the	  North	  and	  Center	  of	   Italy	   excluding	   Lazio,	   whereas	   the	   second	   sub-­‐sample	   includes	   Lazio	   and	   all	   the	   remained	  Italian	  regions.	  The	  choice	  of	   these	  sub-­‐samples8	  seems	  reasonable	  since	  all	   the	  regions	   in	   the	  South	  sub-­‐sample	  (and	  in	  Lazio)	  show	  the	  highest	  values	  of	  social	  filter	  for	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  time	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  	  In	  particular,	  Table	  4	  (South	  sub-­‐sample)	  shows	  that	  the	  estimation	  parameter	  of	   tecit−1 	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  full-­‐sample	  estimation,	  whereas	  the	  parameter	  associated	  with	  the	  social	  filter	  is	  much	   higher	   than	   in	   full	   sample.	   These	   results	   are	   not	   confirmed	   for	   the	   first	   sub-­‐sample	   of	  regions	  as	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.	   	   In	  this	  case	  only	   tecit−1 	  and	   Sfilterit xtecit 	  are	  significant,	  but	  the	  impact	  of	  technological	  knowledge	  and	  of	  the	   Sfilterit xtecit 	  on	  growth	  are	  lightly	  higher	  than	  in	  full	  sample	   estimations.	   This	   result,	   in	   line	   with	   expectations,	   suggests	   that	   the	   majority	   of	  innovative	  activities	  are	  concentrated	  in	  North	  of	  Italy.	  For	  both	  sub-­‐samples	  the	  proposed	  test	  statistics	  confirm	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  estimation	  results.	  	   Table	  3	  –	  Estimated	  elasticities	  for	  Italy	  	   	   Technological	  knowledge	   	   	   Social	  filter	  	   total	  elasticity	  	   direct	  elasticity	  	   indirect	  elasticity	   indirect/direct	  percentage	   	   direct	  elasticity	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Full	  sample	   0.182	   0.238	   -­‐0.055	   	   	   -­‐0.040	  analysis	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   18%	   23%	   -­‐5.5%	   22%	   	   -­‐4%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  South	   0.078	   0.104	   -­‐0.025	   	   	   -­‐0.049	  sub-­‐sample	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   8%	   10%	   -­‐2.5%	   25%	   	   -­‐5%	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  North	   0.319	   0.373	   -­‐0.053	   	   	   -­‐	  sub-­‐sample	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   32%	   37%	   5.3%	   14%	   	   -­‐	  Note:	  The	  measurements	  of	  direct	  and	   indirect	  elasticity	  use	  the	  parameters	  estimated	   in	  Table	  2,	  specifications	   III	  and	   IV.	   For	   example,	   the	   direct	   elasticity	   of	   the	   number	   of	   patents	   is	   calculated	   by	   means	   of	   the	   formula	  
 d etecit−1 =βtecit−1 ( Mtecit−1/ Mγ it ) ,	   where	   Mtecit−1 	  and	   Mγ it 	  represent	   the	   mean	   values	   of	   the	   number	   of	  patents	   and	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	   GDP	   per	   capita	   respectively,	   and	   βtecit−1 	  is	   the	   parameter	   estimated	   in	   Table	   2.	  Indirect	  elasticity	  is	  calculated	  by	  means	  of	  the	  formula	   ind etecit−1 =βsfilterit xtecit−1 ( Mtecit−1/ Mγ it ) .	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Different	  sub-­‐sample	  selections	  have	  been	  tested:	  i.e.	  excluding	  Lazio	  from	  the	  South	  sub-­‐sample	  or	  including	  Lazio	  in	  the	  North	  sub-­‐sample.	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To	  complete	  the	  analysis,	  we	  present	  three	  measurements	  of	  elasticity	  obtained	  by	  means	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  columns	  II,	   III	  and	  IV	  of	  Tables	  2,	  3	  and	  4,	  namely	  the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  elasticity	   of	   the	   technological	   knowledge	   and	   the	   direct	   elasticity	   of	   the	   social	   filter.	   In	  accordance	  with	   the	  methodology	   proposed	   by	  works	   such	   as	   d’Agostino	   et	   al.	   (2011),	   these	  measurements	  give	  an	  immediate	  picture	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  variables	  examined	  on	  economic	  growth.	  The	  estimates	  of	   elasticity	   calculated	   for	   Italy	   and	   for	   the	   two	  proposed	   sub-­‐samples	   as	  regards	  the	  technological	  knowledge	  and	  the	  social	  filter	  are	  presented	  in	  table	  Table	  5.	  Analysis	  of	   these	   values	   yields	   at	   least	   three	   important	   results.	   First,	   the	   impact	   of	   technological	  innovation	  on	  GDP	  per-­‐capita	  growth	  is	  very	  high	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  with	  a	  direct	  percentage	  elasticity	  of	  about	  23%	  (in	  the	  North	  sub-­‐sample	  the	  direct	  percentage	  elasticity	  is	  about	  37%).	  Secondly,	   the	   impact	  of	   innovation	   tends	   to	  decrease	  substantially	  when	  the	   indirect	  elasticity	  influenced	   by	   the	   social	   filter	   is	   taken	   into	   consideration:	   the	   ratio	   indirect/direct	   elasticity	  accounts	   for	   about	   22%	   at	   the	   national	   level	   and	   for	   25%	   and	   14%	   in	   South	   and	  North	   sub-­‐samples	   respectively.	   Thirdly,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   direct	   elasticity	   of	   the	   social	   filter	   on	   Italy’s	  economic	   growth	   is	   very	   marked,	   with	   an	   impact	   of	   about	   4%	   of	   GDP	   growth	   rate,	   which	  becomes	   5%	   looking	   only	   to	   the	   regions	   in	   South	   sub-­‐sample.	   This	   suggests	   that	   policies	  affecting	   social	   and	   institutional	   conditions	   can	   have	   substantial	   repercussions	   on	   economic	  growth	  for	  all	  the	  Italian	  regions	  and	  specially	  in	  South	  Italy	  regions.	  	  	  
5.	  Conclusions	  and	  implications	  for	  policy	  Our	   analysis	   shows	   the	   importance	  of	   endogenous	   factors	   of	   development	   linked	   to	   the	  local	  territory	  as	  regards	  the	  regions’	  ability	  to	  absorb	  technical	  progress	  and	  increase	  their	  rate	  of	   economic	   growth.	   These	   findings	   are	   useful	   in	   assessing	   the	   policies	   to	   be	   adopted	   for	   the	  underdeveloped	  regions	  of	  the	  South	  of	  Italy	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  recent	  trends	  have	  seen	  the	  weaker	   areas	   of	   the	   country	   being	   pushed	   increasingly	   to	   the	   sidelines	   as	   regards	   the	  international	  distribution	  of	  wealth.	  	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  obtained	  in	  this	  work	  calls	  for	  a	  rethinking	  of	  the	  basic	  objectives	  informing	  the	  development	  policies	  for	  Southern	  Italy.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  public	  policies	  should	  not	  be	  confined	  to	  pumping	  resources	   into	  the	  disadvantaged	  regions.	  The	  general	  aim	  should	  rather	  be	   to	  promote	   the	  ability	  of	  economic	  agents	   to	  cooperate	  and	  create	  networks,	  and	   to	  introduce	   models	   of	   governance	   capable	   of	   facilitating	   relations	   and	   the	   dissemination	   of	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knowledge,	   thereby	   generating	   positive	   externalities	   and	   boosting	   the	   productivity	   of	   local	  activities.	  Second,	  policies	  aimed	  at	  a	  marked	  improvement	  of	  institutions,	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  access	  to	   collective	   services	   in	   the	   southern	   regions	   appear	   to	   be	   indispensable	   prerequisites	   for	  intensification	  of	  the	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  acceleration	  of	  economic	  growth.	  The	  model	   developed	   here	   shows	   that	   failure	   to	  meet	   this	   requirement	   nullifies	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  traditional	   policies	   aimed	   at	   material	   infrastructures,	   firms	   and	   innovation.	   In	   our	   view,	   the	  negative	  externalities	  encompassed	  in	  the	  variable	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  reflect	  the	  paralysis	  of	  the	  institutions	  and	  its	  consequences,	  namely	  dissatisfaction,	   lack	  of	  confidence,	  shortage	  of	  public	  assets	  and,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  uncertainty	  and	  high	  transaction	  costs,	  which	  keep	  the	  southern	  regions	  in	  a	  state	  of	  stagnation	  and	  underdevelopment.	  The	   implications	   for	  policy-­‐making	  appear	  vague	  and	  ambiguous.	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	  define	  the	   institutions	   (Rodríguez-­‐Pose	   2010)	   and	   their	   quality	   is	   closely	   connected	   with	   level	   of	  income.	   Institutions	   and	   development	   are	   therefore	   phenomena	   that	   strengthen	   one	   another	  reciprocally	  (Rodrik	  2004)	  and	  the	  same	  formal	  institutional	  structures	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  different	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  accumulation	  of	  social	  capital	  (De	  Blasio	  and	  Nuzzo	  2006).	  Despite	   our	   awareness	   of	   the	   considerable	   simplification	   involved,	   we	   would	   argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  only	  possible	  starting	  point	  for	  policies	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  institutions	  in	  the	  southern	  regions	  is	  a	  reform	  of	  local	  government	  so	  as	  to	  boost	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  human	  resources	  and	  introduce	  a	  substantial	  effort	  to	  monitor	  and	  assess	  the	  results	  pursued.	  	  The	   development	   policies	   should	   then	   focus	   primarily	   on	   the	   upgrading	   of	   collective	  services,	   starting	   with	   education,	   social	   services	   and	   the	   safeguarding	   of	   environmental	  resources.	   There	   are	   two	   reasons	   for	   this.	   First,	   as	   these	   objectives	   represent	   the	   output	   of	  government,	   monitoring	   them	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   assess	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   institutions	  indirectly	   and	   take	   corrective	   measures	   if	   necessary.	   Second,	   and	   more	   importantly,	   an	  improvement	   in	   collective	   services	   is	   the	   minimum	   prerequisite	   for	   elimination	   of	   the	  environmental	   obstacles	   acting	   as	   a	   negative	   externality	   on	   the	   regions’	   ability	   to	   absorb	  innovations	   and	   to	   attract	   and	   retain	   entrepreneurial	   projects	   and	   skills.	   As	  we	   have	   tried	   to	  show	  by	  estimating	  the	  scale	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  social	  filter,	  policies	  that	  reduce	  its	  impact	  could	  have	   major	   repercussions	   on	   the	   economic	   growth	   of	   the	   southern	   regions	   as	   well	   as	   the	  development	  of	  the	  Italian	  economy	  in	  general.	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Appendix	  A	  –	  Results	  of	  PCA	  for	  the	  Italian	  regions,	  1998	  Analysis	  of	  the	  eigenvalues	  in	  the	  correlation	  matrix	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Comp	  I	   Comp	  II	   Comp	  III	   Comp	  IV	   Comp	  V	   Comp	  VI	   Comp	  VII	   Comp	  VII	  Eigenvalue	   3.530	   2.824	   0.727	   0.394	   0.320	   0.140	   0.039	   0.025	  Frequency	   0.441	   0.353	   0.091	   0.049	   0.040	   0.018	   0.005	   0.003	  Cumulative	  frequency	   0.441	   0.794	   0.885	   0.934	   0.974	   0.992	   0.997	   1.000	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Coefficients	  of	  the	  principal	  components	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Comp	  I	   Comp	  II	   Comp	  III	   Comp	  IV	   Comp	  V	   Comp	  VI	   Comp	  VII	   Comp	  VIII	  es	   -­‐0.160	   0.503	   -­‐0.243	   0.205	   -­‐0.581	   -­‐0.407	   0.031	   0.340	  ld	   0.428	   0.257	   -­‐0.321	   -­‐0.224	   -­‐0.133	   0.672	   -­‐0.163	   0.320	  dg	   0.495	   0.180	   -­‐0.031	   0.201	   -­‐0.009	   -­‐0.013	   0.777	   -­‐0.278	  let	   -­‐0.210	   0.522	   -­‐0.118	   0.318	   0.114	   0.238	   -­‐0.298	   -­‐0.641	  rd	   -­‐0.484	   0.096	   0.201	   0.397	   0.244	   0.429	   0.357	   0.433	  rc	   0.527	   0.427	   -­‐0.013	   -­‐0.430	   0.637	   -­‐0.306	   0.055	   0.190	  pf	   0.468	   -­‐0.065	   -­‐0.018	   0.649	   0.336	   -­‐0.212	   -­‐0.356	   0.266	  ass	   0.220	   0.292	   0.884	   -­‐0.059	   -­‐0.232	   0.057	   -­‐0.151	   0.024	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Appendix	  B	  –	  Mean	  values	  of	  each	  variable	  used	  in	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  Region-­‐id	   Region	   γ 	    p _ inv 	    tec 	    Chum 	    Sfilter 	  1	   Piemonte	   0.320	   22.046	   4.800	   4.779	   38.330	  2	   Valle	  D'Aosta	   0.318	   24.028	   3.961	   4.590	   30.258	  3	   Lombardia	   0.263	   19.853	   4.957	   5.241	   28.226	  5	   Veneto	   0.532	   22.603	   4.727	   6.038	   20.615	  6	   Friuli	  Venezia	  Giulia	   0.839	   22.735	   4.616	   6.681	   28.208	  7	   Liguria	   0.890	   18.169	   4.033	   5.265	   46.125	  8	   Emilia	  Romagna	   0.312	   20.983	   5.115	   6.147	   26.051	  9	   Toscana	   0.583	   18.593	   4.241	   6.071	   34.670	  10	   Umbria	   0.227	   21.227	   3.717	   6.463	   39.742	  11	   Marche	   0.789	   21.362	   4.046	   5.138	   34.216	  12	   Lazio	   0.648	   18.187	   3.589	   6.587	   63.326	  13	   Abruzzo	   0.432	   22.898	   3.675	   5.839	   52.607	  14	   Molise	   1.332	   24.934	   1.832	   5.875	   67.680	  15	   Campania	   0.683	   21.197	   2.356	   4.646	   89.487	  16	   Puglia	   0.441	   21.134	   2.303	   4.865	   75.399	  17	   Basilicata	   0.638	   27.194	   1.765	   5.769	   73.761	  18	   Calabria	   0.768	   22.982	   1.559	   5.575	   82.070	  19	   Sicilia	   0.866	   21.206	   2.509	   4.401	   89.710	  20	   Sardegna	   0.723	   25.620	   2.110	   6.283	   68.588	  21	   Bolzano	   0.690	   29.195	   4.059	   6.565	   14.135	  22	   Trento	   0.101	   28.579	   3.855	   7.517	   20.023	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